

Short Paper: Secure Offline Payments in Bitcoin

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
WTSC'19: 3rd Workshop on Trusted Smart Contracts

Outline

- Introduction
- Results
- Previous Research [[DmitrienkoNY17](#)]
- Our New Solution
- Conclusion

Introduction


- Bitcoin requires ...
 - the payee to be online for sending a transaction to the Blockchain.
 - It takes a certain amount of time until the transaction is confirmed.
- In the real life scenario...
 - **Offline** and **Immediate** payment is greatly demanded.
(e.g., Vending Machine, Digital Content Market)
- Fast payment : [Karame:2012]
Vulnerable to **Double-spending attacks**.



Double-Spending Attacks on Fast Payments


[Karame:2012]

The malicious payer makes two payment transactions at the same time, one to the shop, and the other to the payer himself.



Results


- Completely decentralized **offline** and **immediate** payment scheme **without any modification to the existing Bitcoin network.**
- Only requires a tamper-proof wallet.
- Simplifies existing proposed method.



Previous Research [DmitrienkoNY17]

System Model (assume tamper-proof wallet)

1. Online pre-loading phase
2. Offline payment phase
3. Offline coin redemption and double-spender revocation




Previous Research [DmitrienkoNY17] - Security mechanisms

In order to ensure the wallet will not accept illegal pre-loading, Dmitrienko17 proves it by showing **sufficiently large work is elaborated** on the fragment of blockchain (**Subchain**)



Online pre-loading




$$\tau_l, n - T$$

Previous Research [DmitrienkoNY17]

The wallet accepts the pre-loading transaction iff:

$$\text{Hash Rate} \times \text{Time} = \text{PoW} \geq \text{Minimum Difficulty}$$



Previous Research [DmitrienkoNY17]

It is necessary to prove the time taken to generate the fragments against the wallet objectively...

★CHOICE


A) Assume a trusted time-stamp server.

-> Additional assumption

B) Set the expiration time of the pre-loaded coins.

-> Sacrifices the usability

How can I trust
 $\tau_l, n - T$?




Our Construction

We do not require the external trusted time-stamp server and expiration time of the pre-loaded coins...


	[DmitrienkoNY17]	Our new solution
Pre-loading phase	Payer proves Wallet that Money is Preloaded	Payer only give a hint to Wallet (No Proof)
Offline payment phase	Payee accept the transaction if Proof is verified	Payee accept the transaction if Proof is verified AND Money is Preloaded to Wallet

Pre-loading Phase

1. Payer makes pre-load transaction.
2. After the pre-load transaction is into the block, the transaction is sent to the wallet.
3. The wallet accepts the transaction and increase *balance* and store the transaction.



Membership Proof on Merkle Tree




$$member(\tau_l, \tilde{\tau}_l, B_i) = 1$$

Membership Witness
($\tilde{\tau}_l : witness$)

**Payee Y_i does not have to record
all past transactions.**

Pre-loading Phase

1. Payer makes pre-load transaction.
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$$1. \tau_l \leftarrow \text{sign}(sk_X; x \rightarrow w, b_l)$$


Offline Payment

1. Payee charge b_o to Payer.
2. When τ_o is sent from the wallet, Payee checks...

- (a) τ_l is in the payee's chain.
- (b) τ_o is Valid w.r.t. Payee's chain.

Payee's Chain

$\geq k$



if ($balance \geq b_o$)
 $balance \leftarrow balance - b_o$
 $\tau_o \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_W; w \rightarrow y, b_o)$
 $proof \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_T; \tau_o, \tau_l, \tilde{\tau}_l)$
 else *reject*

1. PK_Y, b_o


2. $\tau_o, proof, cert_T$

3. $\text{Sign}(sk_Y; status)$

accept τ_o and *proof* iff

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} cert_T \text{ is trustworthy} \\ \text{Verify}(PK_T; proof) = 1 \\ \tau_o \in (\mathcal{V}_{C_Y} \cap \text{Sign}(sk_W; w \rightarrow \cdot, b_o)) \\ \tau_l \in (\mathbb{C}_Y^{\lceil k} \cap \text{Sign}(\cdot; \cdot \rightarrow w, b_l)) \end{array} \right.$$


Common-Prefix Property [GarayKL15]



- $\mathbb{C}^{\lceil k}$: Blockchain \mathbb{C} with k blocks at the right end removed.
- $\mathbb{C}_1 \preceq \mathbb{C}_2$: \mathbb{C}_2 is a prefix of \mathbb{C}_1

Common-Prefix Lemma

(ϵ, η) -typical execution and consider two chains $len(\mathbb{C}_2) \geq len(\mathbb{C}_1)$


1. \mathbb{C}_1 is adopted by an honest party at round r .
2. \mathbb{C}_2 is either adopted by an honest party or diffused at round r .

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{C}_1^{\lceil k} \preceq \mathbb{C}_2 \wedge \mathbb{C}_2^{\lceil k} \preceq \mathbb{C}_1, \text{ for } k \geq 2\eta\kappa f$$

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
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Coin redemption and Double-spending wallet revocation protocol



Payee sends the offline transaction to the miners and wait until the transaction is confirmed.

Conclusion

- We proposed an efficient offline payment scheme for PoW blockchains such as Bitcoin.
- Advantages of our scheme are it requires...
 - No trusted time-stamp server.
 - No expiration time to the pre-loaded coins.
 - No modification to the existing Bitcoin network.
- **Open Problem :**
 - Offline payment schemes for PoS-type blockchain